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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Contemporary learning theorists often endorse guided discovery learning, as 
opposed to discovery or instruction alone, as the best method to facilitate understanding 
(e.g., Mayer, 2004; Schwartz et al., 2011; Wise & O’Neill, 2009). Providing an 
exploratory activity with subsequent instruction is one form of guided discovery that has 
been shown to aid learning (e.g., Schwartz & Bransford, 1998). However, the level of 
guidance provided during the exploratory activity has largely gone unstudied. I propose 
feedback as one form of guidance that could potentially boost the efficacy of exploration 
by guiding the learner’s search for relevant information. In two experiments, I examined 
how and for whom feedback might enhance learning during exploration prior to direct 
instruction. I investigated these questions in the context of children exploring 
mathematical equivalence, a fundamental concept in arithmetic and algebra. 
 
Guided Discovery Learning 
An emerging consensus is that people learn best through some form of guided 
discovery, which combines exploration and instruction (e.g., Aflieri et al., 2011; Hmelo-
Silver, Duncan, & Chinn, 2007; Lorch, et al., 2010; Mayer, 2004). As Mayer (2004) 
notes, “students need enough freedom to become cognitively active in the process of 
sense making, and…enough guidance so that their cognitive activity results in the 
construction of useful knowledge” (p. 16). There is currently not a precise definition of 
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guided discovery, largely because the term captures such a broad range of activities 
including problem-based learning (Barrows & Tamblyn, 1980), inquiry learning 
(Rutherford, 1964), and constructivist learning (Steffe & Gale, 1995). Here, I adopt the 
general framework outlined by Alfieri and colleagues (2011) and define guided discovery 
as exploratory learning tasks that are supplemented with some form of instructional 
guidance. Learning tasks are exploratory if learners have not received instruction on how 
to complete them and instructional guidance encompasses a variety of tools, from in-
depth instruction manuals to minimal feedback or coaching. Alfieri et al.’s (2011) recent 
meta-analysis revealed the superiority of guided discovery over both direct instruction 
and unguided discovery learning.  
Providing exploratory activities prior to direct instruction is one form of guided 
discovery that has been recommended by researchers in education and psychology alike 
(e.g., Hiebert & Grouws, 2007; Schwartz, Lindgren, & Lewis, 2009), and it is the form 
that I focus on in this paper. For example, several mathematics education researchers 
promote the belief that “each person must struggle with a situation or problem first in 
order to make sense of the information he or she hears later” (Stigler & Hiebert, 1998, p. 
3). Similarly, Schwartz and colleagues suggest that exploratory activities facilitate the 
development of differentiated knowledge of the target domain, which prepares people to 
learn more deeply from future instruction than would be possible otherwise (e.g., 
Schwartz & Bransford, 1998; Schwartz, Lindgren, & Lewis, 2009).  
There is a growing body of evidence to support the claim that exploration prior to 
instruction is beneficial (e.g., DeCaro & Rittle-Johnson, 2011; Schwartz & Bransford, 
1998; Schwartz & Martin, 2004; Schwartz, Chase, Oppezzo, & Chin, 2011). For 
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example, college students who explored novel examples learned more from a subsequent 
lecture on psychology principles than students who merely summarized a relevant text 
prior to the lecture (Schwartz & Bransford, 1998). Further, the timing of instruction 
matters. For example, elementary school children learned new math concepts better if 
they solved unfamiliar problems before receiving instruction, rather than vice versa 
(DeCaro & Rittle-Johnson, 2011). Similarly, middle school students who explored a set 
of novel density problems prior to receiving instruction exhibited better transfer than 
students who heard the lecture first and practiced the problems afterward (Schwartz et al., 
2011). However, further research is needed to optimize this form of guided discovery. 
For example, the level of guidance provided during the exploratory phase has largely 
gone unstudied. In this study, I examine the effects of providing guidance versus not 
providing guidance during exploration prior to instruction. 
 
Using Feedback as One Form of Guidance 
Feedback is touted as one form of guidance that may be particularly effective. 
Feedback is any information about performance or understanding that the learner can use 
to confirm, reject, or modify prior knowledge (Mory, 2004). Based on their meta-
analysis, Alfieri and colleagues (2011) specifically recommend “providing timely 
feedback” as an optimal form of guidance (p. 13). Additionally, Mayer’s review (2004) 
indicates that guided discovery methods that provide feedback or scaffolding during 
problem solving enable deeper learning than unguided discovery methods. For example, 
kindergarteners generally struggle with conservation tasks; however, Brainerd (1972) 
showed that providing outcome feedback to children solving novel conservation tasks 
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improved their explanations on subsequent problems. Although not directly related to 
exploration provided prior to direct instruction, these reviews do suggest that guidance 
during exploratory problem solving can be beneficial.  
In addition to these endorsements, there are several reasons to suggest feedback is 
beneficial. First, decades of research have demonstrated powerful effects of feedback for 
student achievement in the classroom (see Hattie & Timperley, 2007). Indeed, one meta-
analysis comparing feedback interventions to control groups with no feedback included 
470 effects and revealed an average positive effect size of .38 for feedback on student 
performance measures (e.g., reading errors, arithmetic computations; Kluger & DeNisi, 
1996). The effects spanned a variety of feedback types, task types, and means of 
presentation. 
 Second, past research indicates that feedback’s primary function is to identify 
errors and encourage the adoption of correct alternatives (e.g., Anderson, Kulhavy, & 
Andre, 1972; Birenbaum & Tatsuoka, 1987; Kulhavy, 1977). In these studies, learners 
who receive feedback have a higher chance of correcting their errors than learners who 
do not. For example, Phye and Bender (1989) examined the role of feedback on a 
memory task and found that when feedback was not available, perseveration (i.e., making 
the same error multiple times) was the most frequent error type—a pattern not 
demonstrated in the feedback conditions. Also, though feedback may not be necessary for 
new strategy generation, feedback has been shown to facilitate strategy generation 
relative to no-feedback (Alibali, 1999). Together, these studies suggest feedback helps 
learners reject erroneous ideas and search for more plausible alternatives. 
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 Given these positive effects of feedback, it seems likely that it would improve the 
efficacy of exploration prior to direct instruction. However, all reviews of feedback 
research note the wide variability of effects on learning (e.g., Hattie & Timperley, 2007; 
Kluger & DeNisi, 1998; Mory, 2004). In fact, even though Kluger and DeNisi (1996) 
found an average positive effect size for feedback, over one third of the effects were 
negative, indicating that feedback in those cases decreased performance. The authors 
noted the need for further research to determine the conditions under which feedback is 
effective. In this study, I explored the possibility that feedback may enhance the benefits 
of exploration for only a certain subset of learners. 
 
The Role of Prior Knowledge 
The possibility that feedback during exploration is only beneficial for some 
learners is consistent with past work on aptitude by treatment interactions. These occur 
when environments that have positive effects for one kind of person, have neutral or even 
negative effects for another (Cronbach & Snow, 1977; Snow, 1978; Snow & Lohman, 
1984). Importantly, these interactions often occur when instructional approaches differ in 
the amount of guidance provided. For example, Snow and Swanson (1992) suggest tutors 
“should provide more scaffolding for less able learners and less scaffolding for more able 
learners” (p. 610). Feedback represents one form of scaffolding whose benefits may 
depend on certain learner characteristics. 
Particularly relevant to the current study is the expertise reversal effect, a specific 
example of an aptitude by treatment interaction. It “occurs when an instructional 
procedure that is relatively effective for novices becomes ineffective for more 
6  
 
knowledgeable learners” (Kalyuga & Sweller, 2004, p. 558). For example, novices learn 
more from studying worked examples than from solving problems unaided. But, as 
knowledge increases, independent problem solving becomes the superior learning activity 
(e.g., Renkl & Atkinson, 2003). To be clear, the expertise reversal effect involves 
interactions between instructional methods and learners’ knowledge, and need not 
involve experts (e.g., Ayres, 2006; Homer & Plaas, 2009; Kalyuga et al., 2003). 
Importantly, novices seem to benefit from more external guidance, while learners with 
more knowledge seem to benefit from less external guidance (Kirschner, Ayres, & 
Chandler, 2011). Indeed, Kalyuga and colleagues (2003) posit, “instructional guidance, 
which may be essential for novices, may have negative consequences for more 
experienced learners” (p. 24). 
 One explanation for the expertise reversal effect stems from cognitive load theory 
(Sweller, van Merrienboer, & Paas, 1998). For novices who lack schemas in the domain, 
novel tasks can easily overload working memory; thus, they often need external 
guidance. In contrast, higher-knowledge learners have relevant schemas that help them 
complete tasks without overloading working memory; thus, they often do not need 
external guidance. In the present study, providing feedback, a source of guidance, may 
help learners with low prior knowledge; but higher-knowledge learners may not need 
feedback and may even perform better without it.  
 
Current Study 
I examined the effects of feedback during exploration prior to direct instruction 
for children with varying levels of prior knowledge. I focused on mathematical 
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equivalence problems (problems with operations on both sides of the equal sign, such as 
3 + 4 + 5 = 3 + __) because children are rarely exposed to them and often solve them 
incorrectly. Mathematical equivalence problems are relatively novel for second- and 
third-grade children as they are not typically included in elementary mathematics 
curricula (Perry, 1988; Seo & Ginsburg, 2003). Indeed, a recent analysis revealed that, of 
all instances of the equal sign in a textbook series for grades 1 through 6, equations with 
operations on both sides of the equal sign accounted for just 4% of instances (Rittle-
Johnson, Matthews, Taylor, & McEldoon, 2011). Further, decades of research have 
shown that elementary school children exhibit poor performance on mathematical 
equivalence problems (e.g., McNeil, 2008; Rittle-Johnson & Alibali, 1999), which often 
stem from misinterpretations of the equal sign as an operator symbol meaning “get the 
answer,” as opposed to a relational symbol meaning “the same amount” (Baroody & 
Ginsburg, 1983; Kieran, 1981; McNeil & Alibali, 2005). Thus, mathematical equivalence 
problems are unfamiliar and difficult for elementary school children, providing an apt 
domain to investigate exploratory problem solving. 
 In the context of exploratory mathematics problem solving, two types of feedback 
seem particularly relevant: outcome feedback provides a judgment about the accuracy of 
the learner’s response, whereas strategy feedback provides a judgment about how the 
learner obtained that response. Outcome feedback has been studied extensively and is 
generally related to positive learning outcomes (e.g., Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). In contrast, 
few empirical studies have examined the effects of strategy feedback (Ahmad, 1988; 
Luwel, et al., 2011). The limited evidence suggests that strategy feedback can improve 
strategy selection relative to outcome feedback; however, more research is needed to 
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examine its benefits across tasks and outcome measures. My primary goal was to 
compare the effects of providing any feedback to providing no feedback during 
exploration prior to direct instruction. However, I included two types of feedback to 
explore whether different types differentially impact learning and also to bolster the 
empirical evaluation of strategy feedback as a learning tool. 
In the current study, children received a tutoring session that included exploratory 
problem solving followed by brief instruction. During problem solving, children received 
(a) no-feedback, (b) outcome-feedback, or (c) strategy-feedback after solving novel 
mathematical equivalence problems. After the tutoring session, children completed a 
posttest (immediately and after a 2-week delay) that assessed conceptual and procedural 
knowledge of mathematical equivalence (Rittle-Johnson et al., 2011). Conceptual 
knowledge is an understanding of the principles governing a domain and procedural 
knowledge is the ability to execute action sequences to correctly solve problems (e.g., 
Rittle-Johnson & Alibali, 1999). We also incorporated microgenetic methods, such as 
strategy reports (Siegler & Crowley, 1991) and cognitive load ratings (Hart & Staveland, 
1988) to explore how feedback influenced learning.  
The primary hypothesis was that children who received feedback would exhibit 
better procedural knowledge of mathematical equivalence than children who did not. 
However, I expected this effect to be larger for children with lower prior knowledge and 
to disappear or reverse for children with higher prior knowledge based on research on the 
expertise reversal effect (Kalyuga et al., 2003). Differences were predicted in procedural 
knowledge because the feedback was directed at children’s problem solving. Based on 
the promise of strategy feedback in two previous studies (e.g., Luwel, et al., 2011), I 
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tentatively predicted that strategy feedback would lead to higher performance than 
outcome feedback. I also explored why these differences in procedural knowledge might 
occur. Feedback was expected to influence the variability in children’s strategy use, with 
feedback promoting the use of more diverse strategies relative to no feedback (Alibali, 
1999). Finally, feedback was also expected to decrease cognitive load relative to no 
feedback for low-knowledge children, but not for higher-knowledge children, based on 
explanations for the expertise reversal effect (Kalyuga et al., 2003). The results from this 
study will help us understand not only if feedback is beneficial during exploratory 
problem solving prior to direct instruction, but also how and for whom it works. Two 
experiments were conducted with the same basic design to evaluate the replicability of 
the findings. 
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CHAPTER II   
 
EXPERIMENT ONE 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Consent was obtained from 115 second- and third-grade children at a public 
school in middle Tennessee. Of those children 93 met criteria for participation because 
they scored below 80% on both a conceptual and procedural knowledge measure at 
pretest. A liberal inclusion criterion was used to examine learning outcomes for children 
who varied in terms of prior knowledge, but still had room for growth. Data from six 
additional children were excluded: one for failing to complete the intervention, one for 
failing to follow directions, and four for missing the retention test. The final sample 
consisted of 87 children (M age = 8 yrs, 6 mo; 52 girls; 35 boys; 44% Caucasian; 41% 
African American, 6% Hispanic, 9% Other). Approximately 47% received free or 
reduced price lunch.  
 
Design 
  The experiment had a pretest – intervention – posttest design followed by a two-
week retention test. For the brief tutoring intervention, children were randomly assigned 
to one of three conditions: strategy-feedback (n = 25), outcome-feedback (n = 31), or no-
feedback (n = 31).  
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Procedure 
Children completed a written pretest in their classrooms in one 30-minute session. 
Within one week, those who met the inclusion criteria completed a one-on-one tutoring 
intervention and immediate posttest in a single session lasting approximately 45 minutes. 
This session was conducted in a quiet room at the school with one of two female 
experimenters. Approximately two weeks after the intervention session (M = 14.0 days, 
SD = 2.7), children completed the written retention test in small-group sessions in their 
classrooms. 
 The tutoring intervention began with exploratory problem solving. Children were 
asked to solve 12 mathematical equivalence problems presented one at a time on a 
computer screen using E-Prime 2.0 (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). 
Specifically, they were asked to figure out the number that went in the box to make the 
number sentence true. The problems increased in difficulty with two exceptions. The first 
four problems consisted of three- and four- addend problems (e.g., 10 = 3 + ¨, 3 + 7 = 3 
+ ¨, 3 + 7 = ¨ + 6). These were followed by six five-addend problems with a repeated 
addend on either side of the equal sign (e.g., 5 + 3 + 9 = 5 + ¨, 9 + 7 + 6 = ¨ + 6). Two 
additional problems (the seventh and tenth) were simple three-addend problems (i.e., 9 = 
6 + ¨, 7 = 6 + ¨). These were included in the block with the six more difficult problems 
to ensure children in the two feedback conditions received some positive feedback and to 
ensure all children were paying attention. After each problem, children reported how they 
solved the problem and received different kinds of feedback based on their condition. 
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In the strategy-feedback condition, children received feedback on how they 
solved each problem (e.g., “Good job! That is one correct way to solve that problem.”/ 
“Good try, but that is not a correct way to solve the problem.”). The strategy feedback 
was based solely on the correctness of the child’s verbal strategy report and did not 
depend on the correctness of the numerical answer (though these differed on only 3% of 
trials). For example, if a child reported using a correct strategy but obtained an incorrect 
answer (e.g., due to an arithmetic error), we provided positive strategy feedback. In the 
outcome-feedback condition, children received feedback on their answer to the problem. 
This included a judgment about the correctness of the answer as well as the correct 
response (e.g., “Good job! You got the right answer, X is the correct answer.” / “Good 
try, but you did not get the right answer, X is the correct answer.”). The outcome 
feedback was based solely on the correctness of the child’s numerical answer and did not 
depend on the correctness of the strategy used (though these differed on only 4% of 
trials). We provided the correct answer because past work suggests this enhances the 
effects of outcome feedback (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). For both conditions, feedback was 
presented verbally by the experimenter and visually on the computer screen. Finally, in 
the no-feedback condition, children did not receive any feedback after solving a problem 
and were simply told to go to the next one. 
After the exploratory problem solving all children received brief conceptual 
instruction on the relational function of the equal sign, adapted from past research 
(DeCaro & Rittle-Johnson, 2011; Matthews & Rittle-Johnson, 2009). The experimenter 
provided a definition of the equal sign, using a number sentence as an example. 
Specifically, 3 + 4 = 3 + 4 was displayed on the screen while the experimenter identified 
13  
 
the two sides of the problem, defined the equal sign as meaning “the same amount as,” 
and explained how the left and right side of the problem were equal. The meaning of the 
equal sign was reiterated with four additional number sentences (e.g., 4 + 4 = 3 + 5). 
Children were asked to answer simple questions and to identify the two sides of the 
number sentences to ensure they were attending to instruction. No solution procedures 
were discussed and children were not asked to solve any mathematical equivalence 
problems during the instruction. 
Between the exploratory problem solving and instruction, children completed a 
brief form of the mathematical equivalence assessment (midtest) to gauge the immediate 
effects of exploration prior to instruction. Additionally, children rated their subjective 
cognitive load at this time and completed several other measures not relevant to the 
current results. 
 
Assessments and Coding 
The mathematical equivalence assessment, adapted from past work (Rittle-
Johnson et al., 2011), was administered at pretest, posttest, and retention test. Two 
parallel forms of the assessment were used; Form 1 at pretest and Form 2 at posttest and 
retention test. The assessment included procedural and conceptual knowledge scales (see 
Table 1 for example items). The procedural knowledge scale assessed children’s use of 
correct strategies to solve eight mathematical equivalence problems (results are identical 
if based on correct numerical answers, as correct strategies and correct answers differed 
on less than 1% of all trials). The conceptual knowledge scale (8 items) assessed two key 
concepts: (a) the meaning of the equal sign, and (b) the structure of equations. A brief 
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version of Form 1 (5 items—3 conceptual and 2 procedural) was used as a midtest during 
the intervention session. The more difficult items were included on the midtest, as they 
were similar in difficulty to the majority of problems presented during the intervention.  
 
Table 1: Example Items from the Procedural and Conceptual Knowledge Scales on the 
Mathematical Equivalence Assessment 
 
Item Type Task Scoring Criteria 
Procedural  (α = .83 in Exp. 1)  (α = .85 in Exp. 2) 
Familiar 
problems 
Solve 1 problem with operation on 
right side (8 = 6 + ☐) 
Use correct strategy (if strategy 
is ambiguous, response must be 
within 1 of correct answer) 
 
Solve 3 problems with operations on 
both sides, blank on right  
(e.g., 3 + 4 = ☐ + 5) 
Same as above 
Transfer 
problems 
Solve 3 problems with operations on 
both sides, blank on left or includes 
subtraction (e.g., ☐ + 6 = 8 + 6 + 5) 
Same as above 
 Solve 1 equation with an unknown variable (y + 4 = 8 + 2) Same as above 
Conceptual  (α = .64 in Exp. 1) (α = .71 in Exp. 2) 
Meaning of 
equal sign Define equal sign 
1 point for relational definition 
(e.g., the same amount) 
 Rate definitions of equal sign as good, not good, or don’t know 
1 point for rating “two amounts 
are the same” as a good 
definition  
Structure of 
equations 
Reproduce 3 equivalence problems 
from memory 
1 point for correctly 
reconstructing all 3 problems  
 Indicate whether 5 equations such as 3 = 3 are true or false 
1 point for correctly 
recognizing 4 or more 
equations as true or false 
Note. Cronbach alphas are for posttest. Alphas were somewhat lower at pretest, largely 
due to floor effects on some items. 
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We coded the conceptual knowledge items requiring a written explanation (see 
Table 1 for coding criteria). To establish inter-rater reliability, a second rater coded the 
written responses of 20% of the children. Inter-rater agreement was high (exact 
agreement = 95 – 97%; kappas = 90 – 95%). Kappas calculate inter-rater reliability 
adjusting for chance (Cohen, 1960). Values above 81% are considered excellent (Landis 
& Koch, 1977). We also coded children’s problem solving strategies on the procedural 
knowledge assessment and on the intervention problems (Table 2). On the assessment, 
strategies were inferred from children’s written work. For the intervention, strategies 
were based on children’s verbal reports. A second rater coded the strategies of 20% of the 
children. Inter-rater agreement was high (exact = 88%; kappa = 86%). Although specific 
strategies were coded on the procedural knowledge assessment, scores were based solely 
on whether a strategy was correct or incorrect. So we also examined inter-rater agreement 
on correct strategy vs. incorrect strategy use (exact = 99%; kappa = 98%). 
 
Table 2: Strategies Used to Solve Mathematical Equivalence Problems 
Strategy Sample explanation (4 + 5 + 8 = __ + 8) 
 
Correct Strategies 
 
    Equalize I added 4, 5, and 8 and got 17, and 9 plus 8 is also 17.  
    Add-Subtract I added 4, 5, and 8 and got 17, and 17 minus 8 is 9.  
    Grouping I took out the 8’s and I added 4 plus 5. 
    Ambiguous 8 divided by 8 is 0 and 4 plus 5 is 9.  
Incorrect Strategies  
    Add All I added the 4, 5, 8 and 8. 
    Add-to-Equal 4 plus 5 is 9, and 9 plus 8 is 17. 
    Add-Two I added the 5 and the 8. 
    Carry I saw a 4 here, so I wrote a 4 in the blank. 
    Ambiguous I used 8 plus 8 and then 5. 
Note. Italicized strategies were demonstrated in the strategy evaluation task in Exp. 2. 
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Two items measuring subjective cognitive load were administered immediately 
after the exploratory problem solving. Two modified items from the NASA Task Load 
Index were used (Hart & Staveland, 1988): Effort (“I had to work hard to solve those 
problems.”) and Frustration (“I was stressed and irritated when I solved those 
problems.”). Children indicated the extent of their agreement with each item on a 5-point 
scale. Responses to the two items were averaged to form a single score for each child.  
 
Data Analysis 
A contrast analysis of variance model was used, as recommended by West, Aiken 
and Krull (1996). In this model, contrast codes represent a categorical variable with more 
than two levels, which in this case was condition. The condition variable had three groups 
(no-feedback, outcome-feedback, and strategy-feedback), so two coded variables were 
created. The primary goal was to determine whether no guidance or any guidance during 
exploration prior to instruction was more optimal. Thus, the first variable (feedback) 
compared no feedback to the two feedback conditions combined. I also explored whether 
the type of guidance mattered. Thus, the second variable (feedback type) compared 
outcome feedback to strategy feedback. We also included three covariates (children’s age 
and procedural and conceptual knowledge pretest scores). Finally, to evaluate whether 
condition effects depended on prior knowledge two interaction terms were included: 
feedback by prior knowledge and feedback type by prior knowledge. The procedural 
knowledge pretest measure was used as the prior knowledge measure as it is the most 
relevant type of prior knowledge for learning during exploratory problem solving. 
Exploratory analyses indicated that conceptual knowledge pretest scores did not interact 
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with condition. Thus, the statistical model was a contrast-based ANCOVA with two 
contrast-coded between-subject variables (feedback, feedback type), three covariates, and 
two prior knowledge interaction terms. All effects reported with this model are similar if 
the two contrast-coded variables are replaced with a single categorical "condition" 
variable. However, the contrast-based model allows me to test my specific predictions of 
interest using fewer statistical tests. 
The assumption of homogeneity of variance for this model was largely supported. 
For the procedural knowledge variables, Levene’s tests indicated equal variances on the 
posttest and retention test, F’s < 1, though not at midtest, F(2, 84) = 6.30, p = .003 (likely 
due to limited number of midtest items). With all three time points in the same (repeated-
measures) model, covariance matrices were also homogeneous, Box’s M = 8.01, F(12, 
30952) = 0.63, p = .82. For the conceptual knowledge variables, Levene’s tests indicated 
equal variances at midtest, posttest, and retention test, F’s < 2. With all three time points 
in the same (repeated-measures) model, covariance matrices were also homogeneous, 
Box’s M = 7.78, F(12, 30952) = 0.61, p = .83. Overall, ANOVA models were appropriate 
for analyzing the data. 
 
Results 
On the pretest, children answered few procedural (M = 29%, SD = 22%) and 
conceptual (M = 27%, SD = 19%) items correctly. However, the scores ranged from 0 – 
75% on both the procedural and conceptual knowledge scales. Importantly, there were no 
significant differences between conditions on either scale at pretest, Fs < 1. 
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To evaluate children’s performance on the midtest, posttest and retention test I 
conducted repeated measures ANCOVAs with feedback (feedback vs. none) and 
feedback type (outcome vs. strategy) as between-subject variables and time (midtest, 
posttest, retention test) as the within-subject variable. The three covariates as well as the 
two interaction terms were included. The statistical conclusions remain largely 
unchanged when the midtest is removed from the model. Children’s procedural and 
conceptual knowledge were examined as separate outcomes. Feedback was expected to 
lead to higher procedural knowledge scores than no feedback, but only for children with 
lower prior knowledge. For children with higher prior knowledge, I expected either no 
effect of feedback or a reversal such that feedback would lead to lower scores than no 
feedback. The effect of feedback on children’s conceptual knowledge was examined, 
though there were no prior predictions. I also explored if strategy feedback led to higher 
scores than outcome feedback, and whether this effect interacted with prior knowledge. 
 
Procedural Knowledge 
Children’s procedural knowledge increased from midtest to posttest and remained 
similar two weeks later (see Table 3), F(2, 158) = 13.64, p < .001, ηp2 = .15. There were 
no main effects of feedback or feedback type, Fs < 1. However, there was a feedback by 
prior knowledge interaction, F(1, 79) = 5.70, p = .02, ηp2 = .07. Consistent with the 
predictions, as prior knowledge increased, the benefits of feedback decreased (B = –1.04, 
SE = 0.43). Feedback type did not interact with prior knowledge (p = .44).1 
 
                                                
1The overall procedural knowledge results remain unchanged when the midtest is 
removed from the model.  
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Table 3: Procedural Knowledge Scores in Exp. 1 by Condition and Prior Knowledge 
 
Time Prior Knowledge 
No  
Feedback 
Outcome 
Feedback 
Strategy 
Feedback 
Pretest 
Low 15 (9) 13 (9) 13 (9) 
Higher 51 (15) 54 (16) 48 (14) 
Midtest 
Low 0 (0) 22 (31) 23 (32) 
Higher 58 (42) 50 (46) 40 (46) 
Posttest 
Low 26 (31) 39 (34) 32 (27) 
Higher 71 (25) 61 (32) 50 (27) 
Retention Test 
Low 29 (32) 33 (32) 33 (36) 
Higher 81 (22) 71 (27) 41 (32) 
Note. Raw percentage means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses. 
Children are categorized as low or higher prior knowledge based on a median split on the 
procedural knowledge measure at pretest; however, the primary analysis models treated 
prior knowledge as a continuous variable. 
 
 
To help interpret the interaction, I categorized children as having higher prior 
knowledge (scored above the median on the procedural knowledge pretest) or low prior 
knowledge and examined the main effects of feedback for each group (see Figure 1). For 
the low-knowledge group, children who received feedback tended to exhibit higher 
procedural knowledge (M = 34%, SE = 5%) than children who did not (M = 20%, SE = 
6%), F(1, 79) = 3.28, p = .07, ηp2 = .04. For the higher-knowledge group, children who 
received feedback tended to exhibit lower procedural knowledge (M = 49%, SE = 6%) 
than children who did not (M = 66%, SE = 8%), F(1, 79) = 3.66, p = .06, ηp2 = .04. 
Overall, the results resemble an expertise reversal effect (Kalyuga et al., 2003). Feedback 
during exploration was more beneficial than no feedback, but only for children with low 
prior knowledge. For children with higher prior knowledge, the reverse was true, with 
feedback actually hindering learning relative to no-feedback. 
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Note. Scores are estimated marginal means based on midtest, posttest, and retention test 
scores combined. For procedural knowledge, differences are between the no-feedback 
and the two feedback conditions combined. For conceptual knowledge, difference is 
between the outcome-feedback and the strategy-feedback condition. Error bars represent 
standard errors. *p < .05, τp < .07. 
 
Figure 1: Percent Correct on Procedural and Conceptual Knowledge Measures in Exp. 1 
by Condition and Prior Knowledge     
 
 
Conceptual Knowledge 
Children’s conceptual knowledge also changed over time. Scores increased from 
midtest (M = 20%, SE = 2%) to posttest (M = 55%, SE = 2%) and remained similar at 
retention test (M = 51%, SE = 3%), F(2, 158) = 89.73, p < .001, ηp2 = .53. There were no 
effects related to feedback versus no-feedback. There was a marginal effect of feedback 
type, F(1, 79) = 3.56, p = .06, ηp2 = .04, which was qualified by a marginal feedback type 
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by prior knowledge interaction, F(1, 79) = 2.93, p = .09, ηp2 = .04. As prior knowledge 
increased, the benefits of outcome feedback increased relative to strategy feedback (B = 
0.67, SE = 0.39).2 
To help interpret this marginal interaction, the effect of feedback type was 
examined for low- and higher-knowledge children separately (based on a median split on 
procedural knowledge pretest scores, see Figure 1). For the low-knowledge group, there 
were no differences between the types of feedback, F(1, 79) = 0.34, p = .56. For the 
higher-knowledge group, children who received outcome-feedback had higher conceptual 
knowledge (M = 55%, SE = 5%) than children who received strategy-feedback (M = 
38%, SE = 6%), F(1, 79) = 5.07, p = .03. These results suggest that outcome-feedback 
and strategy-feedback promoted similar levels of conceptual knowledge for low-
knowledge children; but outcome-feedback promoted greater conceptual knowledge than 
strategy-feedback for higher-knowledge children. Note that outcome-feedback was not 
more effective than no-feedback for higher-knowledge children (p = .56). 
 
Intervention Measures 
To better understand how exploration impacted learning, I explored children’s 
responses during the intervention. Recall, children reported the strategies they used to 
solve the problems as well as their subjective cognitive load after exploration. 
I was interested in how feedback influenced children’s strategy variability. Past 
work indicates that feedback’s primary function is to identify errors and encourage the 
search for plausible alternatives (e.g., Kulhavy, 1977). Thus, promoting the use of 
                                                
2 The overall conceptual knowledge results remain similar when the midtest is removed 
from the model.  
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different strategies might be one mechanism by which feedback influences exploration. 
Overall, children used a variety of correct and incorrect solution strategies on the 12 
practice problems (see Table 2). The number of different strategies used per child ranged 
from 1 to 6 (M = 2.9, SD = 1.4), and nearly 40% of children used four or more different 
strategies.  
The primary ANCOVA model was used with feedback and feedback type as 
between-subject variables and number of different strategies used as the dependent 
variable. The number of correct and incorrect strategies were examined separately. There 
was a marginal effect of feedback on the number of correct strategies used, F(1, 79) = 
3.04, p = .09, ηp2 = .04, but no other effects were significant. Children who received 
feedback used a greater number of different correct strategies (M = 0.9, SE = 0.1) than 
children who did not (M = 0.6, SE = 0.1). A qualitative examination indicated that the 
effect was slightly stronger for low-knowledge children. For the higher-knowledge group, 
the number of different correct strategies barely differed in the feedback (M = 1.1, SE = 
0.2) and no-feedback conditions (M = 1.0, SE = 0.2). For the low-knowledge group, 
children who received feedback generated a greater number of different correct strategies 
(M = 0.8, SE = 0.1) than children who did not (M = 0.3, SE = 0.2). The pattern of results 
was the same for both types of feedback. 
For the number of different incorrect strategies used, there was a main effect of 
feedback, F(1, 79) = 11.22, p = .001, ηp2 = .12, but no other effects were significant. 
Children who received feedback used a greater number of different incorrect strategies 
(M = 2.4, SE = 0.2) than children who did not (M = 1.6, SE = 0.2). The effect was similar 
in strength for all children. For the low-knowledge group, children who received 
23  
 
feedback (M = 2.8, SE = 0.2) used roughly one more incorrect strategy than children who 
did not (M = 1.9, SE = 0.3). Similarly, for the higher-knowledge group, children who 
received feedback (M = 1.9, SE = .3) used roughly one more incorrect strategy than 
children who did not (M = 1.0, SE = 0.3). The pattern of results was the same for both 
types of feedback. Overall, for low-knowledge children, feedback promoted the use of 
both correct and incorrect strategies relative to no-feedback. For higher-knowledge 
children, feedback promoted the use of incorrect strategies more so than correct strategies 
relative to no-feedback, which may help explain why feedback hindered their 
performance. 
 There were also differences in perseveration—using the same incorrect strategy 
on all of the problems. More children perseverated in the no-feedback condition (23%) 
than in the strategy-feedback (8%) or outcome-feedback (0%) conditions, χ2 (2, N = 87) 
= 8.73, p = .01. Moreover, the effect was more pronounced for children with low prior 
knowledge. For low-knowledge children, more children perseverated in the no-feedback 
condition (32%) than in the strategy-feedback (13%) or outcome-feedback (0%) 
conditions. For children with higher prior knowledge, few children perseverated at all 
(8% in no-feedback condition, 0% in strategy- and outcome-feedback conditions). 
Overall, low-knowledge children used more diverse strategies if they received feedback 
and tended to perseverate on the same incorrect strategy if they did not. Very few higher-
knowledge children perseverated, regardless of feedback condition. 
Researchers often explain the expertise reversal effect in terms of the learner’s 
cognitive resources and the experience of cognitive load (e.g., Rey & Buchwald, 2011). 
Feedback may interact with prior knowledge because of differences in cognitive load. 
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Children’s cognitive load ratings were variable, spanning the scale’s range from 1 to 5 (M 
= 3.1, SD = 0.95). The primary ANCOVA model was used with feedback and feedback 
type as between-subject variables and mean cognitive load as the dependent variable. 
There was a main effect of feedback, F(1, 79) = 4.63, p = .03, ηp2 = .06, but no other 
effects were significant. Children who received feedback experienced higher levels of 
cognitive load (M = 3.3, SE = 0.12) than children who did not (M = 2.8, SE = 0.17). A 
qualitative examination of the means indicates that, for low-knowledge children, those 
who received feedback experienced slightly higher levels of cognitive load than children 
who did not (see Table 4). For children with higher prior knowledge, the difference was 
more pronounced. Those who received feedback, particularly strategy feedback, 
experienced higher levels of cognitive load than those who did not. These results suggest 
that feedback during exploration increased cognitive load relative to no feedback. 
 
Table 4: Children’s Subjective Cognitive Load Ratings Across Experiments 1 and 2 
Condition Prior Knowledge 
Experiment 1 
NASA-TLX 
(out of 5) 
Experiment 2 
NASA-TLX 
(out of 5) 
Experiment 2 
New Item 
(out of 7) 
No Feedback 
Low 3.03 (.96) 3.28 (.93) 3.22 (1.7) 
Higher 2.46 (.58) 3.00 (.94) 4.08 (2.4) 
Outcome 
Feedback 
Low 3.36 (.94) 3.40 (.91) 5.45 (1.2) 
Higher 2.85 (1.1) 3.04 (.83) 4.85 (1.3) 
Strategy 
Feedback 
Low 3.23 (.90) 3.97 (.79) 5.40 (1.2) 
Higher 3.55 (.93) 4.00 (.71) 4.27 (1.9) 
Note. Raw means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses 
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Discussion 
In Experiment 1, the primary hypothesis was supported. Feedback led to higher 
procedural knowledge than no feedback, but only for children with low prior knowledge. 
For children with higher prior knowledge, feedback led to lower procedural knowledge 
relative to no feedback. The secondary analyses indicated that for low-knowledge 
children, feedback promoted the generation of both correct and incorrect strategies and 
also prevented perseveration relative to no feedback. For higher-knowledge children, 
feedback promoted the use of incorrect strategies relative to no feedback. Additionally, 
feedback led to higher subjective cognitive load relative to no feedback, particularly for 
higher-knowledge children. Overall, the benefits of providing feedback during 
exploration prior to direct instruction depend on prior knowledge. Children with low 
domain knowledge benefited more from receiving feedback, whereas children with 
higher domain knowledge benefited more from exploring without feedback. Feedback 
type had little effect in general, with the exception that outcome feedback tended to lead 
to higher conceptual knowledge than strategy feedback for children with higher prior 
children. 
 Despite supporting the primary hypothesis, several limitations remain. First, the 
condition manipulation was not as clean or as strong as it could have been. For example, 
all children were asked to report how they solved each problem. Though this resulted in 
detailed information regarding the strategies used, it inevitably guided all children’s 
attention to some degree on their problem-solving strategies. The strategy-feedback 
manipulation would be stronger if only children in the strategy-feedback condition were 
encouraged to attend to their strategy use. Additionally, the feedback provided in both 
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feedback conditions was relatively vague and not specific to the child’s response. For 
example, in the strategy-feedback condition, incorrect strategies were referred to as “not a 
correct way,” which may have been unclear to children. Further, children in both the 
strategy-feedback and outcome-feedback conditions were told if their target response 
(strategy or answer, respectively) was correct, but only children in the outcome-feedback 
were given additional correct information (i.e., the correct answer). The contrast between 
the two feedback conditions could be improved.  
 Second, I sought to clarify the influences of feedback type during exploration 
prior to instruction. Given the paucity of research comparing outcome-feedback to 
strategy-feedback and the slight variation in means for higher-knowledge children in 
these two conditions, I wanted to confirm that feedback type is not central to children’s 
learning during exploration. To address these concerns, a second experiment was 
conducted similar to Experiment 1, but with several modifications intended to strengthen 
the design. 
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CHAPTER III   
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
Experiment 2 was designed to strengthen the condition manipulation from 
Experiment 1 and verify the results with an independent sample of children. The goal was 
to replicate the finding that low-knowledge children benefit from feedback during 
exploration prior to instruction, whereas children with higher prior knowledge benefit 
from no feedback. The condition manipulation was strengthened in three ways. First, to 
differentiate the conditions, only children in the strategy-feedback condition reported 
how they solved each problem. Children in the other conditions were asked to report 
different information to mimic the interaction with the experimenter (i.e., their answer in 
the outcome-feedback condition and their completion of the problem in the no-feedback 
condition). Second, the feedback was made more specific by having the experimenter 
revoice the child’s response. In the strategy-feedback condition the child’s strategy was 
restated and in the outcome-feedback condition the child’s answer was restated. Finally, 
children in the outcome-feedback condition did not hear the correct answer. In 
Experiment 1, only children in the outcome-feedback condition received additional 
information (i.e., the correct answer). An alternative solution was to provide children in 
the strategy-feedback condition with additional information (i.e., a correct strategy). 
However, telling children how to solve a problem is a form of direct instruction, and I 
was interested in the guidance provided prior to direct instruction. So the correct answer 
in the outcome-feedback condition was eliminated to enhance parallelism across 
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conditions. Consistent with Experiment 1, I expected low-knowledge children to benefit 
more from feedback relative to no feedback and higher-knowledge children to benefit 
more from no feedback, regardless of feedback type. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Consent was obtained from 111 second- and third-grade children at two schools 
(one public, one parochial) in middle Tennessee. Of those children, 101 met criteria for 
participation because they scored at or below 80% on both a conceptual and procedural 
knowledge measure at pretest. Data from six additional children were excluded: two for 
failing to complete the intervention and four for missing the retention test. The final 
sample consisted of 95 children (M age = 7 yrs, 11 mo; 60 girls; 35 boys; 97% African 
American; 3% Caucasian). Approximately 61% received free or reduced price lunch.  
 
Design 
The design and procedure were identical to Experiment 1 with a few exceptions 
outlined below. As before, children were randomly assigned to one of three conditions 
for the intervention: strategy-feedback (n = 31), outcome-feedback (n = 32), or no-
feedback (n = 29). 
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Procedure 
Consistent with Experiment 1, all children received a tutoring session that began 
with exploratory problem solving followed by brief conceptual instruction. The 12 
mathematical equivalence problems from Experiment 1 were used, but were presented in 
paper/pencil format rather than on a computer screen to simulate a more typical 
classroom activity. The computer program was still used by the experimenter to record 
information.  
In the strategy-feedback condition, children reported how they solved each 
problem and received feedback on the strategy, which included a revoicing of the strategy 
report (e.g., “Good job! That is one correct way to solve that problem. [Child’s strategy] 
is a correct way to solve it.” / “Good try, but that is not a correct way to solve the 
problem. [Child’s strategy] is not a correct way to solve it.”). For example, if a child 
reported using the add-all strategy (see Table 2), the experimenter repeated the child’s 
report: “Good try, but that is not a correct way to solve the problem. Adding all the 
numbers together is not a correct way to solve this problem.” The experimenter revoiced 
the strategy just as the child stated it to ensure no additional information was given. If the 
child was unsure of the strategy used, the experimenter stated: “It is not clear if you used 
a correct way to solve this problem. Let’s try another one. This time, try to remember 
how you solved the problem,” though this occurred on only 2% of trials. In the outcome-
feedback condition, children reported their numerical answer and received feedback on 
that answer, which included a revoicing of their answer but not the correct answer (e.g., 
“Good job! You got the right answer, [child’s answer] is the correct answer.” / “Good try, 
but you did not get the right answer, [child’s answer] is not the correct answer.”). Finally, 
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in the no-feedback condition, children reported when they completed a problem and were 
told to go on.  
 
Assessments and Coding 
The mathematical equivalence assessment, modified slightly from Experiment 1 
to improve psychometric properties, was administered at pretest, posttest, and retention 
test. Again, a brief version (5 items—3 conceptual and 2 procedural items) was used as a 
midtest during the intervention. To establish inter-rater reliability, a second rater coded 
the subjective responses of 30% of the children (see Table 1 for coding criteria). Inter-
rater agreement was high for written explanations (exact agreement = 93 – 99%, kappas = 
87 – 98%) and for strategy codes (exact agreement = 91%, kappa = 89%). 
The two subjective cognitive load items from Experiment 1 were administered. A 
third item was also included. It was adapted from past cognitive load studies with 
children as young as 13-years-old (e.g., Ayres, 2006; Kalyuga, Chandler, Sweller, 2004): 
“How easy or hard was it to solve all of those problems?” Children responded on a 7-
point scale ranging from very, very easy to very, very hard.  
A strategy evaluation task was also added, which we administered after the 
posttest and after the retention test, to assess children’s ratings of correct and incorrect 
strategies for solving mathematical equivalence problems (Rittle-Johnson & Alibali, 
1999). Children were told that students from another school had solved these problems in 
different ways. They were presented with examples of the strategies used by these 
students (see Table 2 for the strategies demonstrated). Children were asked to evaluate 
each strategy as “very smart, kind of smart, or not so smart.” This task was included to 
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determine whether differences existed in terms of the recognition of correct strategies. 
However, preliminary analyses indicated no systematic differences between conditions; 
thus, I do not report results for this task. 
 
Data Analysis 
The same ANCOVA model from Experiment 1 was employed. I used a contrast-
based ANCOVA with two contrast-coded between-subject variables (feedback, feedback 
type), three covariates, and two condition by prior knowledge interaction terms. The 
assumption of homogeneity of variance for this model was largely supported. For the 
procedural knowledge variables, Levene’s tests indicated equal variances at midtest, 
posttest, and retention test, F’s < 2.2. With all three time points in the same model, the 
variance-covariance matrices were also homogeneous, Box’s M = 20.09, F(12, 40695) = 
1.60, p = .09. For the conceptual knowledge variables, Levene’s tests indicated equal 
variances at midtest and posttest, F’s < 2, though not at the retention test, F(2, 92) = 4.66, 
p = .01. With all three time points in the same model, the variance-covariance matrices 
were also homogeneous, Box’s M = 13.68, F(12, 40694) = 1.09, p = .37. Overall, 
ANOVA models were appropriate for analyzing the data. 
 
Results 
On the pretest, children answered few procedural (M = 20%, SD = 18%) and 
conceptual (M = 19%, SD = 18%) items correctly. However, the scores ranged from 0 – 
75% on the procedural scale and from 0 – 80% on the conceptual scale. Importantly, 
there were no significant differences between conditions on either scale at pretest, Fs < 1. 
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To evaluate performance on the midtest, posttest and retention test a repeated 
measures ANCOVAs with feedback (feedback vs. none) and feedback type (outcome vs. 
strategy) as between-subject variables and time (midtest, posttest, retention test) as the 
within-subject variable was conducted. The three covariates and two interaction terms 
were also included. The statistical conclusions remain unchanged when the midtest is 
removed from the model. 
 
Procedural Knowledge 
Children’s procedural knowledge scores increased from midtest to posttest and 
remained similar two weeks later (see Table 5), F(2, 174) = 3.77, p = .03, ηp2 = .04. There 
were no main effects of feedback or feedback type, nor did feedback type interact with 
prior knowledge, Fs < 1. However, consistent with Experiment 1, there was a feedback 
by prior knowledge interaction, F(1, 87) = 4.67, p = .03, ηp2 = .05. As prior knowledge 
increased, the benefits of feedback decreased (B = –1.06, SE = 0.49).3 
To help interpret this interaction, children were categorized as having higher prior 
knowledge (scored above the median on the procedural knowledge pretest measure) or 
low prior knowledge and examined the main effects of feedback for each group (see 
Figure 2). For the low-knowledge group, children who received feedback exhibited 
significantly higher procedural knowledge (M = 33%, SE = 4%) than children who did 
not (M = 20%, SE = 5%), F(1, 87) = 4.00, p = .05, ηp2 = .04. For the higher-knowledge 
group, children who received feedback exhibited significantly lower procedural 
knowledge (M = 28%, SE = 5%) than children who did not (M = 50%, SE = 6%), F(1, 87) 
                                                
3 The overall procedural knowledge results remain unchanged when the midtest is 
removed from the model.  
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= 7.54, p = .007, ηp2 = .08. The results replicated the expertise reversal effect found in 
Experiment 1. Feedback was more beneficial than no feedback for children with low 
prior knowledge, but for children with higher prior knowledge, the reverse was true. 
Feedback type did not matter, suggesting that both types of feedback were beneficial for 
low-knowledge children and both were detrimental for higher-knowledge children. 
 
Table 5: Procedural Knowledge Scores in Exp. 1 by Condition and Prior Knowledge 
 
Time Prior Knowledge 
No  
Feedback 
Outcome 
Feedback 
Strategy 
Feedback 
Pretest 
Low 8 (6) 9 (6) 11 (5) 
Higher 38 (19) 39 (19) 32 (10) 
Midtest 
Low 8 (19) 23 (26) 21 (34) 
Higher 43 (46) 29 (32) 40 (38) 
Posttest 
Low 24 (31) 38 (38) 40 (28) 
Higher 49 (41) 32 (23) 30 (27) 
Retention Test 
Low 24 (24) 31 (29) 29 (31) 
Higher 54 (36) 33 (28) 29 (29) 
Note. Raw means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses. Children are 
categorized as low or higher prior knowledge based on a median split on the procedural 
knowledge assessment at pretest; however, the primary analysis models treated prior 
knowledge as a continuous variable. 
 
Conceptual Knowledge 
Children’s conceptual knowledge scores also increased from midtest (M = 21%, 
SE = 2%) to posttest (M = 50%, SE = 2%) and stayed similar at retention test (M = 43%, 
SE = 2%), F(2, 174) = 67.13, p < .001, ηp2 = .44. There were no main effects of feedback 
or feedback type, nor did feedback type interact with prior knowledge, F’s < 1. There was 
a marginal feedback by prior knowledge interaction, F(1, 87) = 3.63, p = .06, ηp2 = .04. 
As prior knowledge increased, the benefits of feedback marginally decreased (B = –0.70, 
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SE = 0.37). Feedback also interacted with time, F(2, 174) = 7.14, p = .001, ηp2 = .08, such 
that the benefits of feedback were stronger at the midtest and decreased over time.4 
To help interpret the marginal interaction, I examined the effect of feedback for 
low- and higher-knowledge children separately (based on a median split on procedural 
knowledge pretest scores; see Figure 2). For the low-knowledge group, children who 
received feedback exhibited slightly higher conceptual knowledge (M = 44%, SE = 3%) 
than children who did not (M = 37%, SE = 4%), F(1, 87) = 2.56, p = .11, ηp2 = .03. For 
the higher-knowledge group, children who received feedback exhibited slightly lower 
conceptual knowledge (M = 29%, SE = 3%) than children who did not (M = 39%, SE = 
5%), F(1, 87) = 2.60, p = .11, ηp2 = .03. Although not reliable, particularly when 
dichotomizing prior knowledge, these conceptual knowledge results resemble the pattern 
of findings found for procedural knowledge.  
                                                
4 The overall conceptual knowledge results remain unchanged when the midtest is 
removed from the model.  
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Note. Scores are estimated marginal means based on midtest, posttest, and retention test 
scores combined. For procedural knowledge, differences are between the no-feedback 
and the two feedback conditions combined. Error bars represent standard errors. *p < .05. 
 
Figure 2: Percent Correct on Procedural and Conceptual Knowledge Measures in Exp. 2 
by Condition and Prior Knowledge 
 
Intervention Measures 
Recall that children were asked to report their subjective cognitive load after the 
exploratory problem solving. I employed the same measure as in Experiment 1 (mean 
ratings of the two NASA-TLX items) and also included a new measure for exploratory 
purposes. To explore children’s ratings, the primary ANCOVA model with feedback and 
feedback type as between-subject variables and cognitive load as the dependent variable 
was used. In Experiment 1, I analyzed children’s verbal strategy reports. However, in 
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Experiment 2 I only had detailed strategy reports from children in the strategy-feedback 
condition, so I could not perform a comparable analysis on children’s strategy variability.  
 Similar to Experiment 1, for the mean rating on the NASA-TLX measure of 
subjective cognitive load, there was a main effect of feedback, F(1, 86) = 5.79, p = .02, 
ηp2 = .06. Overall, children who received feedback experienced higher levels of cognitive 
load (M = 3.6 out of 5, SE = 0.11) than children who did not (M = 3.1, SE = 0.16). 
However, there was also a main effect of feedback type, F(1, 86) = 10.52, p = .002, ηp2 = 
.11. Those who received strategy feedback experienced even higher levels of cognitive 
load (M = 3.9, SE = 0.16) than those who received outcome feedback (M = 3.3, SE = 
0.15). Neither interaction was significant, F’s < 1. A qualitative examination of the 
means (see Table 4) supports these conclusions. On average, children who received 
feedback, particularly strategy feedback, experienced higher levels of cognitive load than 
children who did not. 
 Children’s cognitive load ratings on the new measure were similar to their ratings 
on the original measure, with minor differences. Again, there was a main effect of 
feedback, F(1, 87) = 18.11, p < .001, ηp2 = .17. Children who received feedback 
experienced higher levels of cognitive load (M = 5.1 out of 7, SE = 0.2) than children 
who did not (M = 3.6, SE = 0.3). However, this was qualified by a significant feedback 
by prior knowledge interaction, F(1, 86) = 4.75, p = .03, ηp2 = .05. Follow-up analyses 
indicated that, for the low-knowledge group, children who received feedback experienced 
much higher levels of cognitive load (M = 5.4, SE = 0.3) than children who did not 
receive feedback (M = 3.2, SE = 0.4), F(1, 87) = 23.8, p < .001, ηp2 = .22. For the higher-
knowledge group, children who received feedback experienced more similar levels of 
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cognitive load (M = 4.7, SE = 0.3) to children who did not (M = 4.1, SE = 0.4), F(1, 87) = 
0.79, p = .37, ηp2 = .01. There were no effects related to feedback type. A qualitative 
examination of the means (see Table 4) supports these conclusions. Children who 
received feedback experienced higher levels of cognitive load than children who did not, 
and this was particularly evident for low-knowledge children. 
 
Discussion 
 Results from Experiment 2 were consistent with Experiment 1 and supported the 
primary hypothesis. For children with low prior knowledge, feedback during exploratory 
problem solving led to higher procedural knowledge than no feedback. But, for children 
with higher prior knowledge, feedback led to lower procedural knowledge than no 
feedback. There was a similar, yet weaker effect for children’s conceptual knowledge. 
Feedback type had little effect in general, providing evidence that both types of feedback 
hinder higher-knowledge children’s performance. The exploratory findings on children’s 
subjective cognitive load depended slightly on the measure, though the overall pattern 
suggested that feedback generally led to higher levels of cognitive load than no feedback. 
Overall, Experiment 2 replicated the findings from Experiment 1 with an independent 
sample of children and supported the primary conclusions. 
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CHAPTER IV  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Guided discovery facilitates deeper learning than discovery or instruction alone 
(e.g., Aflieri et al., 2010; Mayer, 2004). For example, providing exploratory activities 
with subsequent instruction can be beneficial (e.g., DeCaro & Rittle-Johnson, 2011; 
Schwartz & Bransford). But, the amount of guidance provided during the initial 
exploration has largely gone unstudied. I examined the effects of feedback during 
exploratory problem solving for children with various levels of prior knowledge. In two 
experiments, children solved unfamiliar mathematical equivalence problems, followed by 
conceptual instruction. Some children received feedback (on their answer or on their 
strategy), whereas others did not. In both experiments, the primary hypothesis was 
supported. Feedback led to higher procedural knowledge than no feedback, but only for 
children with low prior knowledge. For children with higher prior knowledge, feedback 
led to lower procedural knowledge relative to no feedback. Effects on children’s 
conceptual knowledge were weak, suggesting feedback during exploration primarily 
impacts procedural knowledge. Feedback type (outcome vs. strategy) had little effect in 
general. I discuss these findings in light of past research on the expertise reversal effect 
and strategy generation. Finally, I consider the implications for guided discovery learning 
as well as potential future inquiries. 
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The Expertise Reversal Effect 
 The present findings are consistent with research demonstrating expertise reversal 
effects, in which an instructional technique that is effective for novices loses its benefits 
for learners with more experience (Kalyuga et al., 2003). Recall, the more experienced 
learners need not be experts and are often referred to as learners with higher prior 
knowledge (e.g., Kalyuga, 2007). The techniques that have been investigated continue to 
increase. For example, we know that low- but not higher-knowledge learners, benefit 
more from (a) studying a given solution rather than imagining it (Leahy & Sweller, 
2005), (b) seeing worked examples rather than solving open-ended problems (Renkl & 
Atkinson, 2003), and (c) having multiple pieces of information presented together rather 
than in isolation (Kalyuga, Chandler, & Sweller, 1998). The current study extends the 
expertise reversal effect to the use of feedback during exploratory problem solving prior 
to instruction. Children with low prior knowledge need feedback to improve their 
knowledge of correct procedures. Children with higher prior knowledge, on the other 
hand, do not need feedback and actually perform better without it. This occurred even 
though the higher-knowledge children in our study were far from experts and still had a 
lot to learn. 
 As in the current study, low-knowledge learners typically profit from instructional 
methods that provide external support, whereas more knowledgeable learners typically 
profit from less structured methods (Kalyuga et al., 2003). The current findings highlight 
that learners with only moderate levels of prior knowledge can benefit from less 
structured methods. 
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Explanations for the effect stem from cognitive load theory, though expertise 
reversal effects have been found in studies outside of the cognitive load paradigm (see 
Kalyuga, 2007). Cognitive load theory proposes that cognitive resources influence the 
efficacy of instruction (Paas, Renkl, & Sweller, 2003). The goal of any learning task is to 
construct an accurate representation of the information and extract underlying concepts 
and procedures, which requires working memory resources (Sweller, 1988). To do so 
without overtaxing cognitive resources, one needs some form of guidance. For novices, 
this guidance comes from instructional supports, which help reduce the cognitive load 
associated with novel tasks. But for learners with more knowledge, guidance comes from 
pre-existing schemas. If further information is provided, it can result in the processing of 
redundant information (e.g., Kalyuga et al., 2003; Rey & Buchwald, 2011) and increased 
cognitive load. This theory-driven explanation is plausible, although direct evidence for a 
cognitive load explanation is limited (see Kirschner, Ayres, & Chandler, 2011). 
Findings from the cognitive load measures partly support this explanation. The 
general pattern indicated that children who received feedback reported higher levels of 
cognitive load than children who did not, though there were slight differences across 
experiments and measures. This may help explain why higher-knowledge children did 
not benefit from the feedback. Providing them with additional guidance created a more 
cognitively taxing environment than letting them explore on their own. This increased 
load was not germane to the task; rather, feedback may have caused extraneous cognitive 
load (Sweller et al., 1998). However, why did children with low prior knowledge benefit 
from the feedback? These children also tended to report higher levels of cognitive load in 
the feedback conditions than in the no feedback condition. One possibility is that 
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feedback caused germane cognitive load for low-knowledge learners – effortful learning 
that supports the refinement of schema (Sweller et al., 1998). Unfortunately, the 
distinction between germane and extraneous cognitive load is theoretical and current 
measurement techniques do not capture the distinction (Kalyuga, 2011). In addition, 
cognitive load scales have rarely been employed with children; and even in adults the 
ability to provide accurate self-reports of mental effort has been questioned (Schnotz & 
Kurschner, 2007).  
Thus, cognitive load theory provides a plausible account of why feedback during 
exploration aids learning in low-knowledge learners, but harms learning in higher-
knowledge learners. However, difficulties in gathering empirical evidence in support of 
the proposed cognitive load mechanism, particularly in children, makes this account 
difficult to verify empirically. Alternative explanations of the findings also remain (e.g., 
Schnotz, 2010). For example, Schnotz (2010) raises the possibility that children who are 
more motivated thrive in less structured, challenging environments whereas children who 
are less motivated do not. The current data point to the important role feedback can play 
in strategy generation and selection.  
 
Strategy Variability During Exploration 
 One of feedback’s primary roles is to help learners identify errors and search for 
more plausible alternatives (see Mory, 2004). Indeed, in Experiment 1 children who 
received feedback exhibited greater strategy variability than those who did not, and this 
effect was particularly true for the low-knowledge group. For children with low prior 
knowledge, feedback promoted the use of more different strategies relative to no 
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feedback and also prevented perseveration on the same incorrect strategy. Past work 
indicates that cognitive variability is an impetus for cognitive change (e.g., Siegler, 1994; 
Siegler & Shipley, 1995). That is, thinking of or using a variety of strategies can help 
learners evaluate alternative approaches and be more receptive to subsequent instruction 
(e.g., Alibali & Goldin-Meadow, 1993; Perry, Church, & Goldin-Meadow, 1988). 
Feedback during exploration facilitated the use of diverse strategies, including more 
correct strategies, for children with low prior knowledge. Further, feedback prevented 
low-knowledge children from using the same incorrect strategy on all of the problems, 
which supports the idea that feedback’s main function is identifying initial errors (Mory, 
2004). This may help explain why these children ultimately learned more when they 
received feedback than when they did not. 
 Children’s strategy use during the intervention may also provide insight into why 
feedback hindered the performance of higher-knowledge learners. Recall, for the higher-
knowledge group, feedback promoted the use of a greater number of incorrect strategies 
relative to no feedback, but had a much weaker effect on correct strategies. Because 
feedback only facilitated the use of incorrect strategies, it may have had a negative 
impact on their procedural knowledge. If correct strategies compete against incorrect 
strategies for selection, increasing the number of incorrect strategies could reduce use of 
correct strategies (Siegler & Shipley, 1995). 
 Strategy variability use may also shed light more generally on how exploration 
prior to instruction impacts learning. Schwartz and Bransford (1998) suggest that 
exploratory activities facilitate the “development of differentiated knowledge” of the 
target problem space (p. 510). In past studies, exploration improved knowledge of the 
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structure of the target problems (e.g., Schwartz & Martin, 2004) and the concepts 
underlying them (e.g., DeCaro & Rittle-Johnson, 2011). Consistent with this work, 
children in Experiment 1 generated a wide variety of problem solving strategies during 
the exploratory phase. Exploring a problem space may help learners acquire more 
nuanced knowledge, and thus prepare them to learn from subsequent instruction. 
 
Guided Discovery Learning 
The present study also has important implications for research on guided 
discovery learning. In particular, it suggests that prior knowledge (and other individual 
differences) should be considered when evaluating guided discovery methods. Too often 
researchers consider individual differences “an annoyance…to be reduced by any 
possible device,” rather than a source of relevant information (Cronbach, 1957, p. 674). 
Future research should continue to examine these person characteristics to assess the 
generalizability of guided discovery methods and how they can be optimized for certain 
subsets of learners. 
The results also highlight the need to evaluate different aspects of guided 
discovery. I examined the guidance provided during exploration prior to instruction and 
found that more was not always better. Unfortunately, even when researchers recognize 
the benefits of combining discovery and instruction, the usual recommendation is to 
include more guidance (e.g., feedback, hints) during exploratory activities (e.g., Alfieri et 
al., 2010; Mayer, 2004). For example, Mayer (2004) suggests learning may be best 
supported by “instructional guidance rather than pure discovery and curricular focus 
rather than unstructured exploration” (p. 14). However, the results from this study 
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indicate that there is a time for just exploration. Combining unguided exploration with 
subsequent instruction improved higher-knowledge children’s procedural knowledge to a 
greater extent than exploration with feedback. Thus, optimizing learning does not always 
require an increase in guidance; sometimes it requires the removal of unnecessary 
information. 
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Despite the positive contributions of the current study, future research is needed. 
First, studies should continue investigating the effects of feedback type. In this study, 
there were few differences between outcome-feedback and strategy-feedback, and the 
differences that were there were weak and inconsistent. It is possible that outcome and 
strategy feedback influence children’s problem solving in similar ways. However, past 
research suggests that is not the case. For example, Luwel et al. (2011) examined 
children’s use of two different correct strategies for completing a numerosity judgment 
task and found that strategy feedback led to more adaptive strategy selection than 
outcome feedback. It may be that strategy feedback is more beneficial when choosing 
between known strategies as opposed to generating them for the first time. 
More work is also needed to verify the generalizability of the results across 
domains and settings. For example, feedback may have a larger impact for low-
knowledge learners in domains with misconceptions, such as mathematical equivalence, 
because feedback’s role is to facilitate the correction of misconceptions and errors. In 
domains without misconceptions, feedback may be less necessary. Also, feedback may be 
most effective in one-on-one tutoring settings, in which feedback is immediate and can 
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influence current performance. Future work should examine a more feasible application 
of feedback in a classroom setting, such as providing written feedback on a homework 
assignment or test. 
Finally, additional clarifications regarding the distinction between levels of prior 
knowledge are necessary. For example, future work should address what counts as 
sufficient prior knowledge so as to know when feedback during exploration is no longer 
effective. In the current study, higher knowledge was fairly limited. More generally, 
studies that demonstrate treatment by prior knowledge interactions have not identified the 
precise level of prior knowledge at which the reversal occurs. As more and more research 
finds that the effectiveness of instruction depends on prior knowledge, instructors will 
need guidance on how to choose instructional techniques for particular children with 
particular levels of prior knowledge. 
 
Conclusion 
 This study extends research on guided discovery methods in which exploratory 
activities are provided with subsequent direct instruction. I examined how and for whom 
a particular form of guidance, feedback, might enhance learning from the combination of 
exploration and instruction. Feedback during exploratory problem solving facilitates 
learning for children with low domain knowledge. However, children with higher prior 
knowledge benefit more from exploring independently without feedback. Thus, providing 
feedback may not always be optimal. 
46  
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Ahmad, M. (1998). The effect of computer-based feedback on using cognitive strategies 
of problem solving. Proceedings of selected research papers, Association for 
Educational Communications and Technology, Research and Theory Division 
(pp. 1-22). New Orleans, LA: AECT. 
 
Alfieri, L., Brooks, P. J., Aldrich, N. J., & Tenenbaum, H. R. (2011). Does discovery-
based instruction enhance learning? Journal of Educational Psychology, 103(1), 
1-18. doi: 10.1037/a0021017. 
 
Alibali, M. W. (1999). How children change their minds: Strategy change can be gradual 
or abrupt. Developmental Psychology, 35(1), 127-45.  
 
Alibali, M. W., & Goldin-Meadow, S. (1993). Gesture-speech mismatch and mechanisms 
of learning: What the hands reveal about a child's state of mind. Cognitive 
Psychology, 25, 468-523. 
 
Anderson, R. C., Kulhavy, R. W., & Andre, T. (1972). Conditions under which feedback 
facilitates learning from programmed lessons. Journal of Educational Psychology, 
63, 186-188. 
 
Ayres, P. (2006). Impact of reducing intrinsic cognitive load on learning in a 
mathematical domain. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20(3), 287-298. doi: 
10.1002/acp.1245.  
 
Baroody, A. J., & Ginsburg, H. P. (1983). The effects of instruction on children's 
understanding of the "equals" sign. Elementary School Journal, 84, 199-212. 
 
Barrows, H. S., & Tamblyn, R. (1980). Problem-based learning: An approach to medical 
education. New York: Springer. 
 
Birenbaum, M., & Tatsuoka, K. (1987). Effects of "on-line" test feedback on the 
seriousness of subsequent errors. Journal of Educational Measurement, 24(2), 
145-155. 
 
Brainerd, C. J. (1972). Reinforcement and reversibility in quantity conservation 
acquisition. Psychonomic Science, 27, 114-116. 
 
Cohen, J. (1960). A coefficient of agreement for nominal scales. Educational and 
Psychological Measurement, 20(1), 37-46. doi: 10.1177/001316446002000104. 
  
Cronbach, L. J. (1957). The two disciplines of scientific psychology. American 
Psychologist, 12(11), 671-684. doi: 10.1037/h0043943. 
47  
 
Cronbach, L. J., & Snow, R. E. (1977). Aptitudes and instructional methods: A handbook 
for research on interactions. New York: Irvington. 
 
DeCaro, M. S., & Rittle-Johnson, B. (2011, March). Preparing to learn from math 
instruction by solving problems first. In B. Rittle-Johnson & M. S. DeCaro 
(chairs), When are times for telling? Preparing students to learn from instruction. 
Symposium presented at the Society for Research in Child Development 
Conference, Montreal, Canada. 
 
Hart, S. G. & Staveland, L.E. (1988). Development of NASA-TLX (Task Load Index): 
Results of experimental and theoretical research. In: P.A. Hancock & N. Meshkati 
(eds), Human Mental Workload, pp. 139-183. Amsterdam: North Holland. 
 
Hattie, J., & Timperley, H. (2007). The power of feedback. Review of Educational 
Research, 77(1), 81-112. doi: 10.3102/003465430298487. 
 
Hiebert, J., & Grouws, D. A. (2007). The effects of classroom mathematics teaching on 
students’ learning. In F. K. Lester (Ed.), Second handbook of research on 
mathematics teaching and learning (pp. 371-404). Charlotte, NC: Information 
Age Publishing. 
 
Hmelo-Silver, C. E., Duncan, R. G., & Chinn, C. A. (2007). Scaffolding and achievement 
in problem-based and inquiry learning: A response to Kirschner, Sweller, and 
Clark (2006). Educational Psychologist, 42(2), 99-107. doi: 
10.1080/00461520701263368. 
 
Homer, B. D., & Plass, J. L. (2009). Expertise reversal for iconic representations in 
science visualizations. Instructional Science, 38(3), 259-276. doi: 
10.1007/s11251-009-9108-7. 
 
Kalyuga, S. (2007). Expertise reversal effect and its implications for learner-tailored 
instruction. Educational Psychology Review, 19(4), 509-539. doi: 
10.1007/s10648-007-9054-3.  
 
Kalyuga, S. (2011). Cognitive load theory: How many types of load does it really need? 
Educational Psychology Review, 23(1), 1-19. doi: 10.1007/s10648-010-9150-7.  
 
Kalyuga, S., & Sweller, J. (2004). Measuring knowledge to optimize cognitive load 
factors during instruction. Journal of Educational Psychology, 96(3), 558-568. 
doi: 10.1037/0022-0663.96.3.558. 
 
Kalyuga, S., Chandler, P., & Sweller, J. (1998). Levels of expertise and instructional 
design. Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics 
Society, 40(1), 1-17. doi: 10.1518/001872098779480587. 
48  
 
Kalyuga, S., Chandler, P., & Sweller, J. (2004). When redundant on-screen text in 
multimedia technical instruction can interfere with learning. Human Factors, 
46(3), 567-581. 
 
Kalyuga, S., Ayres, P., Chandler, P., & Sweller, J. (2003). The expertise reversal effect. 
Educational Psychologist, 38(1), 23-31. doi: 10.1037/a0022243. 
 
Kieran, C. (1981). Concepts associated with the equality symbol. Educational Studies in 
Mathematics, 12, 317-326. 
 
Kirschner, P. A., Ayres, P., & Chandler, P. (2011). Contemporary cognitive load theory 
research: The good, the bad and the ugly. Computers in Human Behavior, 27(1), 
99-105. doi: 10.1016/j.chb.2010.06.025. 
 
Kluger, A. N., & DeNisi, A. (1996). Effects of feedback intervention on performance: A 
historical review, a meta-analysis, and a preliminary feedback intervention theory. 
Psychological Bulletin, 119(2), 254-284. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.119.2.254. 
 
Kluger, A. N., & DeNisi, A. (1998). Feedback interventions: Toward the understanding 
of a double-edged sword. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 7(3), 67-
72. 
 
Kulhavy, R. W. (1977). Feedback in written instruction. Review of Educational Research, 
47(2), 211-232. doi: 10.2307/1170128.  
 
Landis, J. R., & Koch, G. G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for 
categorical data. Biometrics, 33(1), 159-174. doi: 10.2307/2529310.  
 
Leahy, W., & Sweller, J. (2005). Interactions among the imagination, expertise reversal, 
and element interactivity effects. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 
11(4), 266-76. doi: 10.1037/1076-898X.11.4.266. 
 
Lorch, R. F., Lorch, E. P., Calderhead, W. J., Dunlap, E. E., Hodell, E. C., Freer, B. D., et 
al. (2010). Learning the control of variables strategy in higher and lower 
achieving classrooms: Contributions of explicit instruction and experimentation. 
Journal of Educational Psychology, 102(1), 90-101. doi: 10.1037/a0017972. 
 
Luwel, K., Foustana, A., Papadatos, Y., & Verschaffel, L. (2011). The role of intelligence 
and feedback in children's strategy competence. Journal of Experimental Child 
Psychology, 108(1), 61-76. doi: 10.1016/j.jecp.2010.06.001. 
 
Matthews, P., & Rittle-Johnson, B. (2009). In pursuit of knowledge: Comparing self-
explanations, concepts, and procedures as pedagogical tools. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 104, 1-21. doi: 10.1016/j.jecp.2008.08.004.  
49  
 
Mayer, R. E. (2004). Should there be a three-strikes rule against pure discovery learning? 
The case for guided methods of instruction. The American Psychologist, 59(1), 
14-9. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.59.1.14. 
 
McNeil, N. M. (2008). Limitations to teaching children 2 + 2 = 4: Typical arithmetic 
problems can hinder learning of mathematical equivalence. Child Development, 
79, 1524-1537.  
 
McNeil, N. M., & Alibali, M. W. (2005). Why won’t you change your mind? Knowledge 
of operational patterns hinders learning and performance on equations. Child 
Development, 76(4), 883-899. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2005.00884.x 
 
Mory, E. H. (2004). Feedback research revisited. In D. Jonassen, Handbook of research 
on educational communications and technology: A project for the Association for 
Educational Communications and Technology (2nd. pp. 745-783). Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Paas, F., Renkl, A., & Sweller, J. (2003). Cognitive load theory and instructional design: 
Recent developments. Educational Psychologist, 38, 1-4. 
 
Perry, M. (1988). Problem assignment and learning outcomes in nine fourth-grade 
mathematics classes. Elementary School Journal, 88, 413-426. 
 
Perry, M., Church, R. B., & Goldin-Meadow, S. (1988). Transitional knowledge in the 
acquisition of concepts. Cognitive Development, 3, 359-400. 
 
Phye, G. D., & Bender, T. (1989). Feedback complexity and practice: Response pattern 
analysis in retention and transfer. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 14, 97-
110. 
 
Renkl, A., & Atkinson, R. (2003). Structuring the transition from example study to 
problem solving in cognitive skill acquisition: A cognitive load perspective. 
Educational Psychologist, 38(1), 15-22. doi: 10.1207/S15326985EP3801_3. 
 
Rey, G. D., & Buchwald, F. (2011). The expertise reversal effect: Cognitive load and 
motivational explanations. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 17(1), 
33-48. 
 
Rittle-Johnson, B., & Alibali, M. W. (1999). Conceptual and procedural knowledge of 
mathematics: Does one lead to the other? Journal of Educational Psychology, 
91(1), 175-189. doi: 10.1037/0022-0663.91.1.175. 
 
Rittle-Johnson, B., Matthews, P. G., Taylor, R. S., & McEldoon, K. (2011). Assessing 
knowledge of mathematical equivalence: A construct modeling approach. Journal 
of Educational Psychology, 103(1), 85-104. 
 
50  
 
Rutherford, F. J. (1964). The role of inquiry in science teaching. Journal of Research in 
Science Teaching, 2, 80-84. 
 
Schneider, W., Eschman, A., & Zuccolott, A. (2002). E-Prime User’s Guide. Pittsburgh: 
Psychology Software Tools, Inc. 
 
Schnotz, W. (2010). Reanalyzing the expertise reversal effect. Instructional Science, 
38(3), 315-23. doi: 10.1007/s11252-009-9104-y. 
 
Schnotz, W., & Kurschner, C. (2007). A reconsideration of cognitive load theory. 
Educational Psychology Review, 19, 469-508. 
 
Schwartz, D., & Bransford, J. D. (1998). A time for telling. Cognition and Instruction, 
16(4), 475-5223. doi: 10.1207/s1532690xci1604_4. 
 
Schwartz, D., & Martin, T. (2004). Inventing to prepare for future learning: The hidden 
efficiency of encouraging original student production in statistics. Cognition and 
Instruction, 22(2), 129-184. doi: 10.1207/s1532690xci2202. 
 
Schwartz, D. Lindgren, R., & Lewis, S. (2009). Constructivist in an age of non-
constructivist assessments. In S. Tobias & T. Duffy (Eds.), Constructivist 
Instruction: Success of Failure? (pp. 34-61). New York: Routledge. 
 
Schwartz, D. L., Chase, C. C., Oppezzo, M. A., & Chin, D. B. (2011). Practicing versus 
inventing with contrasting cases: The effects of telling first on learning and 
transfer. Journal of Educational Psychology, 103(4), 759-775. doi: 
10.1037/a0025140. 
 
Seo K.-H., & Ginsburg, H. P. (2003). “You’ve got to carefully read the math 
sentence…”; Classroom context and children’s interpretation of the equals sign. 
In A. J. Baroody & A. Dowker (Eds.), The development of arithmetic concepts 
and skills (pp. 161-187). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
 
Siegler, R. S. (1994). Cognitive variability: A key to understanding cognitive 
development. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 3, 1-5.  
 
Siegler, R. S., & Crowley, K. (1991). The microgenetic method: A direct means for 
studying cognitive development. American Psychologist, 46(6), 606-620. 
 
Siegler, R. S., & Shipley, C. (1995). Variation, selection, and cognitive change. In T. J. 
Simon & G. S. Halford (Eds.), Developing cognitive competence: New 
approaches to process modeling (pp. 31-76). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Snow, R. (1978). Theory and method for research on aptitude processes. Intelligence, 
2(3), 225-278. doi: 10.1016/0160-2896(78)90019-3. 
51  
 
Snow, R. E., & Lohman, D. F. (1984). Toward a theory of cognitive aptitude for learning 
from instruction. Journal of Educational Psychology, 76(3), 347-376.  
 
Snow, R. E., & Swanson, J. (1992). Instructional psychology: Aptitude, adaptation and 
assessment. Annual Reviews in Psychology, 43, 583-626.  
 
Steffe, L., & Gale, J. (Eds.). (1995). Constructivism in education. Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
 
Stigler, J., & Hiebert, J. (1998, Winter). Teaching is a cultural activity. American 
Educator, 1-10. 
 
Sweller, J. (1988). Cognitive load during problem solving: Effects on learning. Cognitive 
Science, 12, 257-285. 
 
Sweller, J., van Merrienboer J., & Paas, F. (1998). Cognitive architecture and 
instructional design. Educational Psychology Review, 10(3), 251-296. 
 
West, S. G., Aiken, L. S., & Krull, J. L. (1996). Experimental personality designs: 
Analyzing categorical by continuous variable interactions. Journal of Personality, 
64(1), 1-48. 
 
Wise, A. F., & O’Neill, K. (2009). Beyond more versus less: A reframing of the debate 
on instructional guidance. In S. Tobias & T. M. Duffy (Eds.), Constructivist 
Instruction: Success of Failure? (pp. 82-105). New York: Routledge. 
